Principais características da governação nas parques de ciência e tecnologia brasileiras by Sampaio Filho, Milton Correia & Nascimento-Santos, Jair
PODIUM  Sport, Leisure and Tourism Review 
Vol. 3, N. 1. Janeiro/Junho. 2014 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
Revista Ibero-Americana de Estratégia - RIAE 
Vol. 16, N. 3. Julho/Setembro. 2017 
e-ISSN: 2176-0756 
DOI: 10.5585/riae.v16i3.2528 
Data de recebimento: 07/04/2017 
Data de Aceite: 28/07/2017 
Organização: Comitê Científico Interinstitucional 
Editor Científico: Fernando Antonio Ribeiro Serra 
Avaliação: Double Blind Review pelo SEER/OJS 
Revisão: Gramatical, normativa e de formatação 
 
 
 
 
 
SAMPAIO FILHO/ SANTOS 
 
 
 
 
 
KEY FEATURES OF GOVERNANCE IN BRAZILIAN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PARKS 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The situation of Brazilian Science and Technology Parks (STPs) operation led to the field research. Even with the 
public policy of stimulus and support of associations, nothing has been mapped on the dissemination of results 
(economic growth and regional development). This scenario instigates the question: What are the governance 
characteristics of Brazilian Science and Technology Parks? A empirical field research was developed, taking into 
consideration the possibility of replication trought the registration of the choice criteria in the multiple cases and trought 
research detalhes and data colection. Eight STPs (TECNOPUC - Porto Alegre, Valetec - Novo Hamburgo, Tecnosinos - 
Sao Leopoldo, Unicamp, CIATEC and TECHNOPARK - Campinas, Rio Park - Rio de Janeiro and SergipeTec) 
participated in research. The results and considerations about the research question allows to infer the little effectiveness 
of governance (without qualitative or quantitative performance indicators) is possibly caused by tensions characterized 
by elements such as heterogeneity in characteristics of organizations that are part of STPs, lack of consensus on 
common goals, pressure forces and influences affecting trusts, nonconformity standards and personal and organizational 
preferences. Leadership relations championed by the government and / or companies can negatively influence the STP's 
performance as a whole. 
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PRINCIPAIS CARACTERÍSTICAS DA GOVERNAÇÃO NAS PARQUES DE CIÊNCIA E TECNOLOGIA 
BRASILEIRAS 
 
 
RESUMO 
 
A situação da operação de Parques Científicos e Tecnologia Brasileiros (STPs) levou à pesquisa de campo. Mesmo com 
a política pública de estímulo e apoio das associações, nada foi mapeado na disseminação de resultados (crescimento 
econômico e desenvolvimento regional). Este cenário instiga a questão: quais são as características de governança dos 
Parques de Ciência e Tecnologia brasileiros? A pesquisa de campo empírica foi desenvolvida, levando em consideração 
a possibilidade de replicação no registro dos critérios de escolha nos casos múltiplos e nos detalhes da pesquisa e na 
coleta de dados. Oito STPs (TECNOPUC - Porto Alegre, Valetec - Novo Hamburgo, Tecnosinos - São Leopoldo, 
Unicamp, CIATEC e TECHNOPARK - Campinas, Rio Park - Rio de Janeiro e SergipeTec) participaram da pesquisa. 
Os resultados e as considerações sobre a questão da pesquisa podem ser inferidas a partir da pouca eficácia da 
governança (sem indicadores de desempenho qualitativos ou quantitativos), possivelmente devido as tensões 
caracterizadas por elementos como a heterogeneidade nas características das organizações que fazem parte dos STPs, 
falta de consenso sobre os objetivos comuns, forças de pressão e influências que afetam a obrigação, padrões de não 
conformidade e preferências pessoais e organizacionais. As relações de liderança defendidas pelo governo e / ou as 
empresas podem influenciar negativamente o desempenho do STP como um todo. 
 
Palavras-chave: Desenvolvimento Econômico Regional; Parques de ciência e Tecnologia; Governança; Eficácia. 
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PRINCIPALES CARACTERÍSTICAS DE LA GOBERNANZA EN LOS PARQUES CIENTÍFICOS Y 
TECNOLÓGICOS DEL BRASIL 
 
 
RESUMEN 
 
La situación de la operación de los Parques Científicos y Tecnológicos de Brasil (STPs) llevó a la investigación de 
campo. Aun con la política pública de estímulo y apoyo a las asociaciones, no se ha hecho ningún mapa de la difusión 
de los resultados (crecimiento económico y desarrollo regional). Este escenario instiga la pregunta: ¿Cuáles son las 
características de gobierno de los Parques Científicos y Tecnológicos de Brasil? Se desarrolló una investigación de 
campo empírica, tomando en consideración la posibilidad de replicación mediante el registro de los criterios de elección 
en los múltiples casos y los datos de investigación y la recopilación de datos. Ocho STP (TECNOPUC - Porto Alegre, 
Valetec - Novo Hamburgo, Tecnosinos - Sao Leopoldo, Unicamp, CIATEC y TECHNOPARK - Campinas, Rio Park - 
Río de Janeiro y SergipeTec) participaron en la investigación. Los resultados y consideraciones sobre la pregunta de 
investigación permiten inferir la poca efectividad de la gobernabilidad (sin indicadores de desempeño cualitativo o 
cuantitativo) es posiblemente causada por tensiones caracterizadas por elementos como la heterogeneidad en las 
características de las organizaciones que forman parte de STPs, objetivos, fuerzas de presión e influencias que afectan a 
los fideicomisos, estándares de no conformidades y preferencias personales y organizacionales. Las relaciones de 
liderazgo defendidas por el gobierno y / o las empresas pueden influir negativamente en el desempeño del STP en su 
conjunto. 
 
Palabras clave: Desarrollo económico regional; Parques Científicos y Tecnológicos; Gobernancia; Eficacia. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The project analysis of Science and 
Technology Parks around the world presents three 
main reasons for its implementation as a regional 
development strategy: (a) creation of new jobs in new 
industries; (b) the need to engage in high-tech and 
market; (c) creating synergies between companies and 
industries. 
The same studies point out that the three main 
reasons for STPs implementation as a regional 
development strategy partly explain a high rate of 
failure as its economic growth objectives (primary 
outcome) and regional development (secondary 
outcomes): 
STPs are formed by actors from civil society 
organizations, governments (different levels), higher 
education institutions and / or research centers, and can 
form a network. This requires synergistic relationships 
that are highly complex in its confrontation of 
instabilities for consolidation and maintenance and also 
an ongoing process of negotiations and alignment of all 
stakeholders interests. Otherwise, there is the context 
for a destabilized network and possible damage to the 
expected results. Keeping the interests of all 
stakeholders aligned with the interests of the actor-
builder network requires a lot of persuasion and 
conviction. Decentralization motivated by the 
interaction of different actors (public or private) 
network requires another approach: the need to 
encourage and facilitate socioeconomic interactions 
and policies between different actors in order to deal 
with problems. 
Governance interorganizational networks 
indicate that the unit or object of analysis are the 
networks, not relations involving networks. 
Interorganizational networks where governance occurs 
are seen as institutional interaction arenas, that provide 
rules, standards, practices and discourses that shape 
actions of the actors and create patterns of interaction. 
Santos (2003, p. 334) alerts that organizational 
networks function as a strategic tool with two facets: 
on the one hand they promise balance and stability to 
participants, on the other they limit the movement of 
their elements by membership rules and other 
commitments. This occurs when the network 
components draw attention or reframe those who try to 
act or are acting as established by the network, thus, 
limiting the flexibility to adapt and survive in a 
dynamic environment. 
Taking advantage of the shortage of field 
research mapping Brazilian reality and specificity of 
science and technology parks in the Brazilian 
geographical context, it worked with the research 
question insead of hypotheses. The exploratory 
research allowed a broader investigative look at 
governance and management practice in Brazilian 
STPs: What are the main governance characteristics of 
Brazilian science and technology parks? 
The formulation of the research question in 
this qualitative research allowed to clarify assumptions 
of the theoretical analysis framework as well as priority 
issues on which the researchers wanted to know. 
The article was structured starting with the 
introduction, which is made of the announcements 
subject, presents the research question and the linked 
purpose. The theoretical framework addresses a 
contextualization about governance in 
interorganizational networks. The mapping of a 
definitory statement proposed a multidisciplinary type 
of governance in interorganizational networks and 
indicates instability on the subject. The purpose of this 
topic is to understand the types, properties and analysis 
processes of governance networks. There is an 
academic interest for a multidisciplinary theoretical 
perspective of organizational relationships and their 
impact on development. The following is the 
methodology, guiding the collection of field data, 
analysis and discussion of the results and finally 
conclusions.  
 
 
2 GOVERNANCE INTERORGANIZATIONAL 
NETWORKS 
 
2.1 Definitory Statement of Interorganizational 
Networks  
 
The study and conceptualization of networks 
in the eyes of Organizational and Interorganizational 
Studies (Kenis & Schneider, 1991; Santos, 2003; 
Galaskiewicz, 2007; Provan & Fish, 2007; Lewis, 
2011; Klijn & Koppenjan, 2012) comprises networks 
as vehicles for services and implementation of 
research. It is the effective exercise of policy-oriented 
issues of actor coordination, the interconnection of 
complex services and the effectiveness of mechanisms 
for achieving results through the creation and supply of 
products, that constitutes the network. 
There are broad definitions of a network as "a 
set of nodes and set of ties representing some 
relationship or lack of relationship between us," the 
content of the relationship between us is "limited only 
by the imagination of the researcher" (Brass et al., 
2004, p. 795), including in its proposal a variety of 
forms of cooperation such as joint ventures, strategic 
alliances, partnerships and consortia. 
 
2.2 Network Type Prospects 
 
This research adopts a defining statement 
drawn from Kilduff and Tsai's research (2003) and the 
level of analysis in which network is a form of 
governance: a network is made up of a group of three 
or more organizations linked through multilateral ties 
58 
 
 
Key Features of Governance in Brazilian Science and Technology Parks 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 Revista Ibero-Americana de Estratégia - RIAE 
Vol. 16, N. 3. Julho/Setembro. 2017 
SAMPAIO FILHO/ SANTOS 
 
generally formally established (instead of occurring by 
chance) and managed (ruled) in order to facilitate the 
achievement of a common goal. Thus, conceptual 
mapping (Faulkner & Rond, 2000; Galaskiewicz, 2007; 
Galaskiewicz & Wasserman, 1994; Kilduff & Tsai, 
2003; Monk & Contractor, 2003) considers that (a) 
networks can be seen as individual organizations (level 
analysis each actor or network node) on a micro-level 
analysis and (b) networks can be seen as a whole on a 
macro-level analysis. This research adopts the 
approach of Fish and Provan (2007): Studies on the 
interactions within the network as a whole: understand 
the properties and characteristics of the network as a 
whole. 
 
2.3 Properties and Analysis Process for 
Interorganizational Networks 
 
The bibliometric mapping prepared by Provan 
and Fish (2007) theoretical framework and used in this 
study, points out that the properties evaluated for 
networks as a whole are adaptations of the properties of 
organizational networks and processes: (a) structure; 
(b) development; (c) results and (d) governance. 
The results of the network structure researchs 
suggests that both its general structure and the 
positioning of each organization influences the 
management of information and knowledge as 
transmitted by its members (Lipparini & Lomi, 1999). 
The density of bonds tends to increase over time 
(Venkatraman & Lee, 2004). Although the 
centralization facilitates the integration and 
coordination, density and centering can not be 
maximized simultaneously (Provan & Milward, 1995). 
Provan and Sebastian (1998) found that the 
effectiveness of the whole can be explained by the 
intense integration of subnets (or cliques). All studies 
show that although the structure of relationships 
between members is the most often studied aspect, is 
strongly dependant on the decisions of its governance. 
Network development can be seen as the 
result of using resources, rules and standards given to 
boost such development (Sydow & Windeler, 1998). 
These rules and regulations depend on the knowledge 
of the mechanisms, meanings, goals and values of all 
the comprised organizations (Lipparini & Lomi, 1999; 
van Raak & Paulus, 2001). 
The effectiveness of the network results 
involves analysis of the efficacy of the companies’ 
results and the efficiency of the inter-organizational 
learning. Analysis in terms of the effectiveness of the 
results to society, indicates that interorganizational 
networks do not always have positive results. Under 
certain conditions, a cooperative network can have 
negative effects on the whole economy (eg, as in the 
case of agreements). It may become a structural source 
of competitive advantage between organizations (Soda 
& Usai, 1999) or between regions (Grabher, 1993). 
Human and Provan (2000) found that the 
continuity of the networks was strongly dependent on 
the internal and external legitimacy beyond the support 
in the early stages of evolution. They concluded that 
those formally constructed (and unstructured from 
previous relationships) are more likely to fail. 
Governance is a critical factor that influences 
the previous three. Networks can be a superior mode of 
governance, but need to be better understanding of how 
they are governed. 
 
2.4 Governance Interorganizational Networks: 
Conceptualization 
 
The term governance may have different 
meanings. Clarke (2004), Machado Filho (2011) and 
Smith (2012) works provide a definition of 
governance, in contrast to the management. They also 
identify a coherent typology with a timeline, inferring 
on the needs of adaptation to the economic 
development since the industrial, services and 
knowledge economy, presented in three phases: the 
Agency Theory, the Stakeholder Theory and the 
Stewardship Theory. 
The Agency Theory (Williamson, 1975, 1985, 
1991, 1994, 1996), the dominant model of academic 
research, government regulatory frameworks and 
voluntary initiatives market, explains that a firm is a 
nexus of contracts between individual production 
factors having as conceptual basis of the control 
separation and ownership, for two distinct groups of 
interests need to be aligned in order to generate value 
for the business: on one side are investors, shareholders 
and owners, on the other side, other managers or agents 
that raise funds with investors for production. In this 
context, governance is understood as an instrument by 
which an order is achieved by different agents in an 
incomplete contractual relationship, settling any 
conflicts, to facilitate the achievement of common 
gains. 
The Stakeholder Theory, by Freeman (1984), 
complements the approach of the Agency Theory 
expanding the vision of managers for external analysis 
environment: indicates who has stake (part / interest) in 
an organization is not only the shareholders 
(stockholders -USA or shareholders-England), but also 
all civil society that impact and are impacted by 
operations (involving aspects of environment and 
social responsibility). Friedman and Miles (2002), 
Blattberg (2004) and Clarke (2004) point out that in 
this approach the organization is a set of arrangements 
and multilateral agreements of the enterprise 
interdependence and its stakeholders and its 
governance is concerned with stabilizing the balance 
between social objectives and economic and between 
individual and collective goals. 
The Stewardship Theory, by Donaldson 
(1990a, 1990b) and Barney (1990, 1991) deconstructs 
the division between agents and shareholders and the 
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importance of their conflicts of interest: employees, 
managers, executives and company CEO constantly 
seek the best for the company and for themselves, the 
individual and collective interests are fully 
interconnected, managers can choose to act as agents or 
principals. 
The Agency Theory, as summarized in Figure 
1, is presented as an alternative form of management of 
economic activities and an interaction between market 
and hierarchy. Stakeholder Theory guides a balance 
between the need to look at the market and continuity. 
In the perspective of Stewardship Theory, governance 
in organization network (formed by independent 
organizations and, in general, they are essentially 
cooperative ventures) is characterized as the design of 
the structure and organization of elements and internal 
coordination of networks. 
The Stewardship Theory, among the three 
approaches is the closest that presents the operational 
reality of a network. It is also the most criticized by the 
disbelief of full alignment of individual and collective 
interests, thus requiring more specific rules and 
monitoring. 
 
Figure 1 - Governance Concept 
 
 
ECONOMY 
 
THEORY AUTHOR - YEAR GOVERNANCE CONCEPT 
Industrial 
Agency 
Theory 
Williamson (1975, 1985, 
1991, 1994, 1996) 
OCDE (1987, 1996) 
A system in which corporations are directed and 
controlled, with the distribution of rights and 
responsibilities among different participants agents 
as the board, managers, shareholders and other 
stakeholders, in an incomplete contractual 
relationship, settling any conflicts. 
Aims to guarantee the creation of value for the 
business and its distribution to shareholders 
Services 
Stakeholders 
Theory 
Freeman (1984) 
Friedman & Miles (2002) 
Blattberg (2004) 
Clarke (2004) 
A system in which the organization is a set of 
arrangements and multilateral agreements 
interdependence of the enterprise and its 
stakeholders; They are directed and controlled the 
distribution of rights and responsibilities among the 
participants and the Council, managers, 
shareholders and other stakeholders. 
Aims to ensure the generation of balanced value 
between the look of the market (for the business 
and its distribution to shareholders) and social 
continuity (with all stakeholders of society that 
impact and are impacted by operations involving 
environmental aspects and responsibility social). 
Knowledge 
Stewardship 
Theory 
Donaldson (1990a, 
1990b) 
Barney (1986, 1990, 
1991) 
World Bank (1992) 
Donaldson & Davis  
(1991) 
Davis, Schoorman, & 
Donaldson (1997) 
Albers (2005) 
Theurl (2005) 
Provan & Kenis (2008) 
Barney & Hesterly 
(2008) 
Oriented system to generate value for the 
organization as a whole (and not only for 
shareholders). managers can choose to act as agent 
or principal (employees, managers, executives and 
CEO constantly seek the best for her and for 
themselves, the individual and collective interests 
are fully interconnected). 
 
Source: Prepared by the authors of this research (2014). 
 
It is understood that governance has a set of 
internal and external mechanisms to harmonize the 
relationship between the principal (shareholders) and 
agents (managers), orients and guides which and how 
relevant decisions to a network level as a whole are 
taken - decisions to achieve important goals, 
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maintaining key relationships and providing feedback - 
and who makes the decisions. In order to give overall 
direction to the business or group that has been 
administered, and monitor and control the executive 
actions of the administration must meet the legitimate 
expectations for accountability and regulation, with 
interests beyond corporate boundaries. Governance 
involves the business rules of the network game, rules 
for decision-making, monitoring, control, definition of 
incentives and sanctions for the network as a whole and 
its participants. Rules implemented by people, 
managers responsible for the effectiveness of the 
collective.  
 
2.5 Governance Interorganizational Networks: 
Methodology 
 
Objectives and needs of these actors may even 
conflict with the objectives of the network. For these 
reasons, the shared governance model is often difficult 
to maintain, and more likely to run on networks with 
few members and involving mutually dependent 
organizations with complementary and compatible 
goals (Olson, 1999; Park, 1996; Provan, 1994)  
In studies of interorganizational networks, the 
term governance is adapted to the context of 
organizations performances and has its concept 
changed as the context, evolving into a broader view of 
the economy. Magnifies questions about why and 
under what conditions an organization should opt for 
the formation of a network instead of the hierarchical 
structure or market and increases its complexity. 
Olson (1999), Park (1996), Provan (1994), 
Provan and Kenis (2008) developed derived 
propositions of empirical research, identifying three 
basic models of governance in interorganizational 
networks: shared governance, governance with leading 
organization and governance through network 
administrative organization or trilateral governance. 
The simplest model is Participant-Governed 
Networks (shared governance), in which groups of 
organizations work collectively as a network, but do 
not have a formal and unique management structure. 
Governance takes place through meetings of 
undertakings representatives or even informally, 
through the actions of those who have an interest in the 
success of the network (Olson, 1999; Park, 1996; 
Provan, 1994). 
The problem with this model is that, although 
it has a strong ideological appeal (due to the idea of 
participation) is generally not very effective because it 
depends on actors who have many other commitments 
of time and resources in their own organizations 
(Provan & Kenis, 2008). 
A second governance model is called Lead 
Organization–Governed Networks, which typically 
occurs in vertical relationships, client-supplier, in 
which there is a larger and more powerful organization 
and a set of smaller and weaker firms (Olson, 1999; 
Park, 1996; Provan, 1994; Provan & Kenis, 2008). 
The activities and key decisions are 
coordinated by a member who acts as a leader and 
manager of the network, facilitating the activities of the 
participants in their efforts to achieve the objectives of 
the network. The strong point of this governance model 
is the efficiency and legitimacy provided by the leading 
organization. One limitation is the fact that this 
organization can try to impose their own agenda and 
dominate the other participants in the network, causing 
resentment and resistance. This can also lead 
participants to a loss of interest in the network's goals, 
focusing exclusively on your individual goals, 
undermining the viability of the network (Provan & 
Kenis, 2008; Windeler, 2003). 
The third model of governance is called by 
Provan and Kenis (2008) as Network Administrative 
Organization (NAO). Park (1996) uses the term 
trilateral governance. The three authors believe that this 
model is a consequence of networks inefficiency with 
shared governance and the problems of domination and 
resistance networks with leading organizations. 
A separate management organization 
composed of professional agents is created in order to 
manage the network and its activities, to monitor the 
behavior of the parties, manage the process of 
collective decision-making, coordinate and sustain the 
network. Such an entity is not a new firm or agency, 
established to manufacture their own goods or offer 
their services, but an integrated management office 
(Olson, 1999; Park, 1996; Provan & KENIS, 2008). 
 
 
3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
The strategy of exploratory research field 
adopted was the multiple case study. Yin (1984, 1993), 
Stake (1978, 2000), Bryman (2004), George and 
Bennett (2005), Gerring (2007) defend that it is a 
research strategy of applied social sciences that aims to 
investigate a contemporary phenomenon within its real 
life context to identify causal relationships, identify 
without measuring the variables. 
Yin (1984, 1993), Stake (1978, 2000), Bryman 
(2004), George and Bennett (2005), Gerring (2007) 
converge in explaining the logic that governs the 
strategy of this kind of research is not sampling but 
replication. Each case should be selected according to 
the following estimates: (a) expect to find similar 
results in the various units investigated: replication 
itself or (b) expected results due to different factors 
previously anticipated by the investigator: theoretical 
replication. 
In this research, by its exploratory character 
and few existing documentation on the Brazilian reality 
of governance in STPs, similarities and differences or 
characteristics are the result of field research. Our main 
concern was to ensure replication for recording the 
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criteria for selecting the multiple cases and the 
interactive search details with triangulation of data 
collected performed. 
As the initial response rate to the online 
questionnaire was only three (TECNOPUC - Porto 
Alegre, UNICAMP - Campinas and SergipeTec - 
Sergipe), it was decided to establish contact with the 
representatives of the three respondents. These were 
the seeds of a multiple case chain. The other five 
contacts (Valetec - Novo Hamburgo, Tecnosinos - Sao 
Leopoldo, Rio Park - RJ, CIATEC and 
TECHNOPARK, both in Campinas) were made by the 
personal intervention of the initial respondents 
managers. We used the approach in chains with a 
random sample of participants (network design site). 
The triangulation method refers to the 
collection of data using different methods and sources 
in order to increase the reliability of the study. Data 
collection for this study aims to explore, define and 
justify the case study. The methods are: (a) qualitative 
interviews; (b) document analysis and (c) comments. 
Such qualitative methods are chosen to provide access 
to complex issues that are not normally covered by 
quantitative methods (Buckle, Dwyer, & Jackson, 
2009). 
The documentary analysis allows contrast the 
information and knowledge acquired from the 
interviews. The observations are based on formal and 
informal conversations with the administration and 
with network participants, in contrast to the 
information gathered in the interviews, the accessed 
documents and observed interactions. 
The type of qualitative interview chosen for 
this study is semi-structured because that makes it 
possible to use interviews and arrange them according 
to the session dynamics (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). 
There were forty interviews (average of five per STP) 
involving strategic management, tactical management, 
operational, business managers installed in STPs. 
The authors conducted a qualitative analysis 
of the interviews extracts. Analyses were coded 
according to the concepts mentioned in theory and in 
order to respond to the formulation of the problem. 
This means that the knowledge and the information 
gathered is related to how the governance processes 
were established as the core training manager occurred 
and how the STP was structured and managed in the 
case studies. The encoding data was reiterated several 
times to adjust the results of case studies to theoretical 
and problem formulation. 
 
 
4 ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
 
Due to the inherent difficulties of data 
collection, this research was limited in scope to 
multiple case studies (eight STPs). Multiple case 
studies do not represent a sample whose results would 
be generalizable for a population, a statistical 
generalization. But it allows to generate theoretical 
propositions from a particular set of results, that are 
applicable to other contexts, in a strategy of replication, 
either by recording the criteria of choice of the multiple 
cases or by the details of the interactive research with 
triangulation of the data collected. 
Access to the updated list showed another 
severe and paradoxical limitation: in a cycle of 
innovation-intensive and knowledge-intensive 
business, it silences requests for access to public 
information, highlighting points of improvement, 
minimally on the criterion of transparency of 
governance. 
The same scenario has already been reported 
of scope limitations (studies of multiple cases), 
restrictions of access to information on Brazilian STPs 
and the impossibility of result generalization instigates 
more questions than certainties. 
 
4.1 Account of the history of personal / professional 
life 
 
It was found that in STPs with more Science 
Parks- SPs features arise indications of involvement, 
commitment, belonging and concern for the STP. 
Monitor progress, stagnation or even retrogression in 
research and its possible consequences on the 
continuity of the STP. There is no indication of the 
individual contributions importance in the context of 
STP organizations involvement to contribute to the 
continuity in a highly competitive economic 
environment. 
The origin of the participants is related to their 
graduation or post-graduation, participation in 
scientific initiation projects, preparation of business 
plans. Teacher leadership helped the construction of the 
students future vision. These participants permanence 
in SPs has a longer duration when compared to 
participants of Technology Parks-TPs. 
It was found that respondents in Technology 
Parks-TPs showed less involvement and commitment, 
they evaluate the world in an utilitarian and pragmatic 
way. They also have strong business relationship, are 
concerned with the market changes and the 
development of rapid acceptance and sales solutions. 
The perception is commitment and duties with the 
organization in which they are employed. Monitor 
progress, stagnation or even retrogression of market 
opportunities and how their work can be taken 
advantage off. 
The origin of its participants is related to 
short-term research projects or previous experiences in 
market companies. They understand that TPs are 
research centers structured by the company they work 
for business incubation.  
 
4.2 Definition of STP 
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When actors or participants in Brazil define a 
science park, they tend to do it formally but also with 
concearn as if they were in a selection process, 
resorting to paper documents or electronics. They built 
the explanation with words like: research center, 
university, research grants, support agencies, support 
companies and publications. 
These results show alignment to the literature 
when they highlight features or basic criteria such as 
having formal links with the university or other 
educational and research institutions and allow the 
formation and growth of technology-based companies 
and other organizations that are also located on site. 
But nothing makes reference to the stimulus of 
technology transfer, promotion of actions aimed at 
increasing the capacity of businesses and other 
enterprises that reside on site. 
When actors or participants in Brazil define a 
technology park, they tend to do it informally; is as if 
describing the company where they work. They use 
keywords such as: business incubators, micro-
enterprise, government support, access to finance, 
profit. 
The responses indicate a formal knowledge, 
but not internalized when compared to the literature 
about what a STP is. Even in literature, there is a lack 
of STP concept of wider and universal application. 
 
4.3 Expected results of a STP 
 
Regardless of the STP, the speeches show a 
well targeted stakeholder interests represented by the 
interviewees. 
Members of universities or research institutes 
stressed that they commercialize results of academic 
research, expanding the sources of funding, broadening 
institutional mission and expanding labor market for 
researchers and students. 
Entrepreneurs and academics entrepreneurs 
(incubated companies) highlighted that they use results 
of academic activities and research so as to enhance 
their own R&D business activities, maximizing 
financial returns, accessing qualified human resources 
and creating jobs. Some business owners reported the 
interest and support of funding agents and venture 
capital to invest in new technology-based companies 
with high and fast economic growth potential. 
Development agencies were not included in the face of 
field work restrictions. Maybe that's why it wasn’t 
noticed in the speech analysis references to revitalizing 
economically depressed regions or promoting regional 
development.  
No statements about the knowledge of the 
STP as a whole was done by the respondents. They 
show difficulty or lack of identification about STP's 
priorities and capabilities as a public policy tool. This 
can maximize nonadherence as development inductor 
to local or regional reality. Such considerations are 
illustrated by extracts from the speeches of the 
following interviews. 
The analysis up to this stage to suggest that 
STPs are considered inducers of academic projects, 
when CPs or inducers of new projects, when TPs. 
The practice shows no concept of 
internalization and possibly consequences in the 
management guidelines. There is no counterpart to the 
speech, metrics that monitor the return on economic 
and social investment of STPs. 
 
4.4 Effectiveness of the STP results 
 
Initially, the goal was to understand the 
effectiveness of the STP results either by the efficiency 
of the structure and governance, whether the 
effectiveness of inter-organizational relationships, 
involving learning the STP actors. The following 
points were analized: the existence of common goals 
for the STP as a whole, the existence of an agreement, 
consensus on the results to be achieved by the STP, the 
difficulty in doing so, and the perception of a 
governance model. 
STPs's goals according to stakeholders are: 
 
a) universities or research institutes: 
commercialize academic research results, 
broadening the sources of financial resources, 
broadening institutional mission, expanding 
labor market for researchers and students 
b) business people and academics entrepreneurs 
(incubated companies): using results of 
academic activities and research to enhance 
their own R&D and business activities, 
enhancing financial returns, accessing 
qualified human resources, creating jobs, 
investing in new technology-based companies 
with high and fast economic growth potential 
and financial returns. 
 
Such objectives are not related to metrics 
(performance indicators established measurement 
method) on goals within specific periods, whether 
quantitative or qualitative. Even without the literature 
cited in the survey, this gap in the monitoring process 
is misaligned with the best management practices and 
governance. 
Complaints arose involving difficulties in 
qualified people, sometimes requiring migration 
experts from other states or even countries, not 
exploitation of regional development potential of new 
products and services and the difficulty of exchanging 
knowledge mainly management technologies. 
Complaints about the difficulties of achieving 
the specific results of stakeholders is in line with the 
literature. Luger and Goldstein (1991), Castells and 
Hall (1994) and Bass (1998) point out that the three 
main reasons for the implementation of STPs partly 
explain a high failure rate of STPs as its economic 
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growth objectives (primary outcome) and regional 
development (secondary outcomes): (a) creating new 
jobs in new industries presupposes previous investment 
in professional training, or requires experts migration; 
(b) interest to engage in high-tech market concentrating 
high-growth industries in poorer regions economically. 
In addition to requiring the assumption of the previous 
item, it reveals the inattention to the difference between 
locational aspects of manufacturing products 
agglomeration economies and the need to adapt to an 
economy of knowledge and (c) create synergies 
between the business and industry requires investment 
in means of communication facilitating the exchange of 
knowledge. 
The lack of metrics makes the attempts to 
solve the claims unsubstantiated and increases the 
difficulty of requesting support to change public 
policies. Also, that makes it harder to demonstrate 
negative impact in the absence of return over 
investment. 
Respondents, possibly due to anonymity, 
showed concern for the lack of evidence on  STPs 
initiatives on the economy, society and regional 
environment. The reports demonstrate knowledge 
about the dependence on public and private financial 
resources and the difficulty of achieving STPs 
continuity. They understand that Brazilian STPs, 
regardless of location or level of development, are 
presented more as an excessive political argument to 
the implementation of a physical structure to support 
enterprises, better use of the land (real estate) than as 
possible inducers of growth and economic 
development through better university-business-
government interaction. 
 
4.5 Governance: definition and main actors 
 
As a possibloe consequence of the lack of 
STPs common goals, the understanding of what is 
governance and which actors are responsible for it 
appears to be confusing and even non-existent. Three 
observations: 
 
a) There is an understanding about governance, 
possibly by the strong bond with the specific 
objectives to specific stakeholders, without 
common general objectives, that leads to 
concept dissociation. Despite knowing what 
governance is, the respondents make no 
conections to PTCs day by day activities. 
b) Due to the strong bond to specific 
stakeholders, the respondets understand the 
concept of working network and 
interorganization network, but consider that 
their daily activities are contrary to this 
interelational exercise; 
c) It is understood that there is park management, 
following established guidelines, but 
apparently poorly revised, by councils or 
committees: steering committee, top board, 
board of directors or advisory board. Even this 
structure is not fully communicated. 
 
The literature induces the understanding that 
between the three presented theories on governance, 
stewardship would be the most aligned. The 
proposition of a STPs governance model is based on 
the governance conceptual foundations of a 
organizations network with distinct interests that need 
alignment for better effectiveness. By having direct or 
indirect public funding, they should consider 
environmental and social interests. 
Empirical research shows another perspective: 
due to the lack of common goals, the theory of agency 
is the most current one: each organization with its 
representative stakeholder establishing the guidelines. 
When stakeholders are members of 
universities or research institutes, they stress the 
commercialization of academic research results, 
broadening of the sources of funds, increased 
institutional mission, expanding labor market for 
researchers and students. When business and academic 
entrepreneurs (incubated companies) highlighted that 
they use results of academic activities and research to 
enhance their own R&D business activities, enhance 
financial returns, access qualified human resources and 
create jobs. Some business owners reported the interest 
and support of funding agents and venture capital to 
invest in new technology-based companies with high 
and fast economic growth potential and financial 
returns. 
Nothing appears in the speeches covering the 
stakeholder theory: relationships with external 
stakeholders (suppliers, society, government, 
shareholders, customers, consumers, creditors) and 
internal (employees, managers, owners). Even less 
when it comes to the stewardship presented by the 
literature as having greater adherence to STPs. 
Reviewed by the Agency Theory, the 
relationship between the parties is established 
contractually to develop activities that meet the main 
interests, involving power delegation for decision 
making by the agent. Governance guidelines are 
established to face agency problems and for strategic 
decision makers: monitoring and controling 
mechanisms to reduce these differences. 
As a consequence, the Stewardship Theory is 
absent, although literature recommends it. Governance 
in this theory is a continuous process to accommodate 
different interests, common troubleshooting and 
performing cooperative actions; providing guidelines to 
collective action, coordination and monitoring of 
internal and external networks of a STP; guiding the 
degree of hierarchy and democratization of the 
organizations decision-making structures, collaborative 
agreements not in hierarchical relations can be 
articulated; guiding the construction of organized 
networks; management of interactions; regulatory 
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systems and mechanisms for coordination and 
negotiation between social actors. This would allow the 
implementation of its principles (Organization 
recommendations for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development (OECD): transparency (disclousure), 
equity (fairness); accountability and corporative 
responsibility (compliance). 
It is characterized by a strong bureaucracy and 
with many documentation manuals. The action and 
effective implementation of the common results is 
compromised by lack of investment in new people 
management methodologies (processes and 
technologies) and, consequently, little personnel 
training for collaborative work.  
The analysis up to this stage suggests that the 
absence of a platform that integrates common goals 
and consequently performance integrated metrics, 
prevent a reasoned response. Certainly STP actors 
present results, but nothing related to the effectiveness 
of STP as a whole. There is a high possibility of low 
scientific, economic, social and environmental STP 
return, as they admit to intentionally not work 
collaboratively. The pressure for specific outcomes 
leads to networking resistance. 
The analysis and brief discussion of the results 
lead to another question to continue the research: What 
are the main barriers to the effectiveness of governance 
in Brazilian science and technology parks? It may 
indicate a complex challenge: to implement a 
governance structure and guidelines in an environment 
in which its actors confuse governance with 
management. Empirical research allows us to infer that 
the main barrier is probably the concepts non-
introjection, principles and practices of governance. 
Without clearly communicated and periodically 
reviewed strategic guidance, the results may not even 
be classified as effective, compromising the stability of 
STPs. 
 
 
5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMENDATIONS 
 
When starting this research, it was understood 
that STPs are made by actors of civil society 
organizations, governments (different levels) and 
higher education institutions and / or research centers. 
They could form an interorganization network where 
governance can play a strategic role in the synergistic 
relationships of high complexity in its confrontation of 
instabilities for consolidation and maintenance. 
The considerations on the research question- 
What are the main characteristics of the governance in 
Brazilian science and technology parks? - indicate a 
misalignment of literature: the Brazilian STP actors do 
not recognize the existence of governance to guide 
strategic, tactical and operational actions. 
Empirical research has another bias: due to the 
lack of common objectives, agency theory is the one 
that most presents itself in the governance 
management: each organization with its representative 
stakeholder establishing the guidelines: science parks 
with the university, technology parks with the 
Companies. 
Diverging from literature, the results 
perceived in STPs are directed to its main stakeholders: 
science production and technology commercialization. 
There are expected objectives in each stakeholder. 
These same goals are not accompanied by metrics 
(established performance indicators, benchmarking 
method) on goals to be achieved in a given time frame, 
either quantitative (how to do) or qualitative (how to 
behave or how satisfied the beneficiaries are). Even 
without specific literature cited in the research, this 
process monitoring gap is out of alignment with best 
governance practices. 
Given the arguments on how STP projects are 
sold, the most consistent type of governance would be 
Stewardship Theory. The lack of common objectives 
for STPs as a whole, the mix of governance and 
management understandings can adversely affect the 
implementation of their principles of transparency 
(disclousure); Fairness; Accountability and corporate 
responsibility (compliance). 
It seems that the argument of being inducers 
of regional development is more political, detached 
from internal communication and practices and 
external to STPs. They involve the difficulty or lack of 
priorities and capabilities identification on Brazilian 
STPs as an instrument of public policy. It is not 
explicit, thus misaligned from the literature, an 
integrated action of job creation; establishment of new 
businesses; facilitating the interaction between 
universities and companies located in the parks and 
promoting the diffusion of new or high technologies 
for the development of the region where they operate. 
Nothing was said about common goals, which 
blended the specific objectives into a single strategic 
platform. There is a lack of performance indicators that 
validate the various impacts resulting from the 
implementation of STPs in Brazil. 
The possibility of low scientific, economic, 
social and environmental returns of the STP as a whole 
is great since they admit not to work intentionally in a 
collaborative way. The collection of specific results 
leads to the resistance to network. 
As STP initiatives involve the provision of 
considerable public and private financial resources, the 
absence of performance evidence is troubling. There 
are no counterparts to the speech, metrics that monitor 
the return on the economic and social investment of 
STPs. 
The dependence on the contribution of public 
resources that the STP projects demonstrate can not be 
justified as to the return on this investment, be it 
economic, social or environmental. 
Brazilian STPs, regardless of location or level 
of development achieved, are more a political argument 
for the implementation of a physical support structure 
65 
 
 Key Features of Governance in Brazilian Science and Technology Parks 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
Revista Ibero-Americana de Estratégia - RIAE 
Vol. 16, N. 3. Julho/Setembro. 2017 
SAMPAIO FILHO/ SANTOS 
 
for companies, better use of land (real estate projects) 
than as possible inducers of sustainable economic 
growth and development trought better university-
business-government interaction. 
The discourse on governance and on STP, 
after content analyzis, presents guidelines of 
instrumental rationality: proposes, applies, defends and 
reinforces the use of successful models, sells an idea of 
structures and relationships that can be guaranteed by 
agreements and contracts. With all the actor 
heterogeneity involved in Brazilian STPs and the 
superposition of functional (administrative, political, 
economic and social) charges with tactical and 
operational performance criteria that are not fully pre-
established and in the face of governance guidelines 
that do not have common objectives to STPs as a 
whole, managers tend to perform governance in an 
overly bureaucratic bias. 
The absence of a networked culture, the arena 
of conflicts arising from the heterogeneity of actors 
involved in a STP, the absence of a continuous 
cognitive, social and emotional qualification aimed at 
negotiating these conflicts can lead to ineffective 
execution (effectiveness understood by the conjunction 
of efficiency in the use of the intellectual and 
emotional energy from those involved and the 
effectiveness of the results obtained in line with the 
defined strategies). 
Work operations on STPs can be well 
structured with clear procedures. But there is no point 
in an operation with structured procedures without 
defined strategies, clear objectives and people who can 
not establish collective learning connections. 
The adoption of foreign models is still 
recommended. Adopting models involves copying 
processes and learning the work techniques. The 
effectiveness of this qualification may have an effect 
on interpersonal and interorganizational behaviors and 
relationships through principles and guidelines based 
on clear strategies, communicated, constructed in a 
participatory manner, simple operations and 
procedures. 
These considerations contributed to the 
objective of characterizing governance in the context of 
Brazilian science and technology parks.  
From this research, proposals can be made to 
broaden the knowledge of Social Science about STPs: 
how to work the guidelines and actions of governance 
so they can be understood as a new form of 
organization not e controlled xclusively by central 
units, but also distributed in the interaction of different 
actors 
Another collaboration is outlined in Political 
Science's view of STPs: How to establish negotiating 
arenas, complementary political channels to traditional 
government channels to establish common goals 
through better interaction between different actors 
(government, public administrations and interest 
organizations)? 
It was not the objective of this research to 
propose a general model capable of explaining the 
performance of STPs, since it involves a large number 
of factors that directly or indirectly affect the 
performance of STPs as a whole, expanding with the 
complexity of interorganizational relationships, 
participants’ interdependence and mutual influences. 
There are other research questions that may contribute 
to the studyes of Organizational and 
Interorganizational Studies on STPs: 
 
a) What is the change in the organizations 
performance and the STP as a whole to each 
new tenant association? The inability to 
compare actors' performance before and after 
joining them would be aligned: it understands 
STPs as networks and as vehicles for service 
delivery and research implementation.  
b) What would be the effectiveness of a 
functional structure with three actor profiles in 
STPs governance strategic decision makers, 
operational managers and institutional 
relations managers? Actors recruited, selected 
and continuously qualified in cognitive, social 
(interpersonal relations) and emotional 
(behavioral) skills. Oriented to guide the 
continued negotiation of strategies, tactics and 
operations. 
c) Are there certain STP structures more 
effective than others? For example, are STPs 
with fewer participants more effective than 
STPs with higher density of renters? Are there 
other structural properties that are crucial to 
the overall effectiveness of STP? How is the 
presence of structural holes? Are there other 
critical factors than those not contemplated in 
the literature? ANPROTEC's more effective 
action and partnership with Brazilian STPs 
and their nuclei of governance could enable 
continued monitoring of governance and STP 
performance in the short, medium and long 
term; 
 
The hope is that the discussions and 
propositions stemming from the theory-empiricism of 
this study will contribute to the better effectiveness of 
STPs. That strategies and operations can be 
successfully performed by managers-leaders recruited 
and selected by the set of cognitive-social-emotional 
(behavioral) competencies and not only by protocol 
criteria. 
It is recommended that regional development 
researchers who frame arguments and proposals for the 
realization of projects that contemplate characteristics, 
both of the region, and of the essential competences of 
strategists and executors should include the complexity 
of the topic in your searches. 
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